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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890031-CA 
v. : 
KENNETH JAMES MORRELL, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of robbery, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1978). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did either Officer Wayment's testimony concerning a 
telephone number listed in a police report or the limitation of 
cross-examination of Matthew Moor infringe on defendant's right 
to confrontation? Being a question of law, this Court must 
review it for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985); Western Fiberglass v. Kirton, McConkie & 
Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2. If Officer Wayment's testimony or Matthew Moor's 
examination violated defendant's right of confrontation, did 
defendant preserve this issue for appeal? If the issue was not 
waived, is any constitutional violation harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt? This presents questions of law not determined 
by the court below. This Court must make original legal 
determinations regarding waiver and prejudice. Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall# 475 IKS. 673, 681 (1986) (relying on Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
122 (Utah 1989). 
3. If Officer Wayment's testimony or Matthew Moor's 
examination did not violate defendant's right of confrontation, 
did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling on these 
evidentiary matters? Evidentiary rulings are reviewed only for a 
clear abuse of discretion. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 
(Utah 1987); State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
allowing the State to present impeachment evidence of defendant's 
pre-Miranda warning failure to exculpate himself? As an 
evidentiary ruling, this issue is subject to the clear abuse of 
discretion standard stated above. 
4. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in 
admitting evidence of defendant's prior robbery under Utah R. 
Evid. 609(a)(2)? Where evidence is improperly admitted, this 
Court must review its admission for prejudicial effect; that is, 
absent the error, is there a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for defendant? State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 121, 
n.10 (Utah 1989); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
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5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
admitting as rebuttal evidence defendant's prior robbery for 
purposes of proving defendant's intent under Utah R. Evid. 403 
and 404(b)? As an evidentiary ruling, this issue is subject to 
the clear abuse of discretion standard stated above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes, constitutional provisions and 
rules for a determination of this case are in pertinent part: 
U.S. Const, amend. Vis 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a): 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is 
one excluding evidence, the substance of the 
evidence was made known to the court by offer 
or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked. 
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Utah R. Evid. 403s 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b)s 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a): 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)s 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
• • • 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The 
statement is offered against a party and 
is (A) his own statement, in either his 
individual or a representative capacity, 
or (B) a statement of which he has 
manifested his adoption or belief in its 
truth, or (C) a statement by a person 
«4_ 
authorized by him to make a statement 
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement 
by his agent or servant concerning a 
matter within the scope of his agency or 
employment, made during the existence of 
the relationship, or (E) a statement by a 
coconspirator of a party during the course 
and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Utah R. Evid. 803s 
The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted 
activity. A memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business 
activity to make the memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, all as shown by 
the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the source of 
information or the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
The term "business" as used in this paragraph 
includes business, institution, association, 
profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
. • • 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, 
reports, statements, or data compilations, in 
any form, of public offices or agencies, 
setting forth (A) the activities of the 
office or agency, or (B) matters observed 
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which 
matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil 
actions and proceedings and against the 
Government in criminal cases, factual 
findings resulting from an investigation made 
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless 
the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Kenneth J. Morrell, was charged with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) (R. 23-24, 30). On December 1, 1988, 
a jury trial commenced before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah (R. 27). On December 2, 1988, the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty of the lesser included offense of robbery, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1978) 
(R. 28, 118). On December 19, 1988, defendant was sentenced to 
the statutory indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the 
Utah State Prison, to run concurrently with his previous sentence 
and with credit for time served awaiting trial (R. 122). 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on January 18, 1989 (R. 123). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately midnight on September 4, 1988, 
Ambassador Pizza received a telephone call to deliver pizza and a 
soft drink to 813 Genessee Street, Salt Lake City Utah. The call 
constituted the last delivery for the night (T. 14-15). 
Matthew Moor, a nineteen year delivery man for 
Ambassador Pizza, drove to what he thought was Genessee Street 
near 800 West (T. 15). He observed defendant standing on the 
The two volumes of trial transcript (R. 137 and 138) have been 
paginated separately, as opposed to continuously. To avoid 
confusion and to be consistent with appellant's brief, volume R. 
137, the trial transcript for December 1, 1988, will be referred 
to as (T. - ) , and volume R. 138, the trial transcript for 
December 2, 1988, as (T2. - ) . Additionally, volume R. 139 is a 
miscellaneous volume containing the hearings on defendant's 
motion in limine and his sentencing. These will be referred to 
respectively as (MT. -) and (ST. - ) . 
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corner and asked him if the street was in fact Genessee (T. 15). 
Defendant said MyesM and then asked Moor if he had seen a red 
Camero; Moor said "no" (T. 15-16). Moor proceeded to the 
delivery address, about two houses from the corner (T. 15, 16). 
No lights were on in the house and no one answered when Moor 
knocked on the door (T. 16). Moor returned to his car "and was 
getting ready to leave and [defendant] came and approached [Moor] 
with what [Moor] thought was the intention of buying a pizza from 
[him]" (T. 16). Defendant asked Moor what type of pizza it was, 
stating he did not want it if it had green peppers and onions (T. 
16). Normally, Moor would not try to resell pizza but since it 
was the last delivery of the evening, he decided to sell the 
pizza to defendant rather than throw it away (T. 16-17). 
Throughout this conversation, Moor was sitting in his car with 
the window rolled down (T. 17). When Moor told defendant he 
could purchase the pizza for $5.00, defendant replied, "Why don't 
you give me the pizza for free?" (T. 18). Defendant then grabbed 
Moor, holding what Moor thought was a knife to his neck, and told 
Moor that he was being robbed (T. 18). Even though Moor could 
not see the knife, he felt something sharp, "sharp enough that 
[he] wasn't going to struggle" (T. 20). Defendant told Moor to 
hand over the keys to the car and then defendant got into the 
passenger side of the vehicle (T. 20, 21). The pizza and drink 
were left on the street (T. 52). 
Once in the car, defendant demanded money from Moor (T. 
21). Moor gave defendant about $26.00 from one of his pants 
pockets. Defendant then asked Moor where his "bank" was (T. 21). 
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A "bank" is a small, leather carrying case used by the drivers to 
carry money at night (T. 22). Moor had put his "bank", 
containing approximately $800.00 dollars, in his pants because he 
was somewhat suspicious when there were no lights on at the 
delivery address (T. 37, 53-54). Moor told him that a co-worker 
had mistakenly taken his "bank" on the last delivery (T. 22). 
Defendant told Moor to drive to a "very dark place," 
telling Moor that he was going to search the car for the "bank" 
(T. 22-23). Throughout the drive, defendant held the knife to 
Moor's side, threatening to kill him if he did not cooperate (T. 
23-24). At the location, defendant searched the car (T. 24). 
Moor suggested that they drive to a house around 1000 
East and 400 South, claiming that his girlfriend lived there and 
that she would give Moor money (T. 25). Moor knew that no one 
would be at the address but thought, since it was only four 
blocks from Ambassador Pizza, he might be able to get help (T. 
25). 
When no one answered at the Fourth South house, 
defendant told Moor to drive towards the "Avenues" area and find 
a house without any lights on so that they could "eventually do 
what he had done to me, rob Domino's" (T. 26). Moor testified 
that he was continuing to cooperate with defendant because he was 
afraid (T. 24, 27-8). On the way, defendant had Moor stop at a 
drive-up pay telephone at 800 East 200 South and call Domino's 
Pizza. No one answered as Domino's was closed (T. 28). 
Defendant told Moor that he was "sick of these games". 
Defendant said he did not believe Moor and that Moor "had one 
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last chance to get him the amount of money he wanted, and if that 
didn't work that he would use the knife" (T. 29). Moor responded 
that a co-worker might have some money. Moor drove to the co-
worker's, Ivan's, house at 1985 South 200 East (T. 29-30). 
Defendant told Moor to back into the driveway, roll up the 
windows, lock the doors, and then honk and yell for Ivan (T. 30). 
Moor did so, hitting the fence as he backed into the driveway (T. 
58). 
Ivan Ilov, thirty-six years old, heard the honking and 
came out to the car (T. 69-71). It was about 2:00 a.m. and Ivan 
thought Moor was playing some kind of joke. But when Ivan looked 
into the car, he observed Moor's "sweat-out eyes" and "worried" 
look" and realized "something was wrong" (T. 71). Ivan tried to 
get a better look at defendant who was leaning against Moor (T. 
71-72). Moor asked Ivan for some money, stating "I have a guy 
with a knife in my back, can you get as much money as you can." 
(T. 72, 77-78). Simultaneously, Moor grabbed defendant's hand 
and Ivan broke through the driver's window of the car (T. 32, 
73). Ivan testified that he broke the window "because at the 
moment I was trying to open the door. I realized the door is 
locked and the guy [the defendant] got nervous and I got a 
feeling he was already penetrating with the knife, so I got 
really wild and I broke the window" (T. 73). A brief struggle 
occurred. Defendant jumped out of the car and Ivan and Moor 
began to chase him (T. 62, 73). 
Moor caught up with defendant. Defendant hit him, 
breaking Moor's nose (T. 62, 74). Defendant continued to run and 
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Moor caught up again, tackling defendant near the Sconecutter 
Restaurant, 2100 South State (T. 62-63, 75). When Ivan caught 
up, defendant was still wrestling with Moor. Ivan helped subdue 
defendant (T. 34, 75). Moor waived down a passing taxicab, 
telling the driver to call the police (T. 35, 76). When Moor 
asked defendant where he had put the money, defendant pulled the 
money from his pockets and threw it on the ground. Moor picked 
it up (T. 76). Moor went into the Sconecutter to wash himself 
while waiting for the police (T. 82). 
When the police arrived, Moor was still in the 
Sconecutter restaurant and Ivan was holding defendant (T2. 9). 
Officer Miller went to one side of defendant and took defendant's 
arm, holding it up behind his back. Officer Neeley stood by 
defendant's other side (T2. 13). After the victim was 
interviewed, defendant was placed under arrest (T2. 5). No 
weapon was ever recovered. 
Defendant testified on his own behalf (T2. 20). He did 
not deny the encounter with Matthew Moor, the subsequent attempts 
to get more money or the altercation at Ivan Ilov's home (T2. 23-
36). Instead, defendant claimed he had met Moor in July at a 
party and had given Moor $45.00 worth of marijuana without 
receiving any payment (T2. 25-26, 47). Defendant stated that it 
was merely a coincidence that he was standing on the corner when 
Moor drove by to deliver the pizza (T2. 22). Defendant 
maintained that his sole reason for approaching Moor was to get 
the money owed him. Defendant denied any intent to rob the 
victim (T2. 39-40, 53, 58). 
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Matthew Moor denied ever meeting defendant and denied 
purchasing any marijuana from him (T. 35-36, 41-43). 
In rebuttal, Paul Christensen testified that in June 
1988, he was robbed by defendant (T2. 75). In that robbery, a 
telephone order for pizza and a soft drink had been placed to 
Free Wheeler Pizza late on a Saturday night (T2. 75, 83). Mr. 
Christensen drove to the address given. When he got there, the 
house was dark and no one answered. Defendant appeared from the 
side of the house. Mr. Christensen thought defendant had ordered 
the pizza (T2. 75). Defendant asked Mr. Christensen what the 
pizza cost and started digging in his pockets as if to get money. 
Suddenly, defendant knocked the pizza and drink out of 
Christensen's hand and pulled out a gun (T2. 76). Defendant told 
Christensen to lie on the ground and to give him all his money 
and checks. Christensen turned over approximately $200.00. 
Defendant asked where the rest of the money was and if 
Christensen had any money in his car. Christensen said "no". 
Defendant told Christensen to walk down the street. Christensen 
did and when he turned around, defendant was gone (T2. 76-77). 
Defendant did not deny his culpability for the robbery 
of Christensen in June. In fact, defendant had pled guilty to 
that crime (T2. 55, 86-87). Defendant maintained that he had 
committed the Christensen robbery because of a drug habit, a 
habit which he claimed he was undergoing treatment for one or two 
months prior to the Moor altercation (T2. 56, 60-62, 86-87). 
The jury was instructed on the crime charged, 
aggravated robbery, and its lesser included offense, robbery (R. 
-11-
101-103, Court's Instructions to Jury). The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty to the lesser included offense of robbery (R. 
118). On appeal, defendant has not raised any issue* concerning 
the appropriateness of the jury instructions or the sufficiency 
of the evidence for conviction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not violate defendant's right to 
confrontation in allowing testimony concerning a telephone number 
listed in a police report or in limiting cross-examination of the 
victim-witness. Further, defendant failed to preserve any 
confrontation issue for purposes of appeal by only objecting on 
general evidentiary grounds. Even if defendant did not waive 
this issue and a violation of his right to confrontation did 
occur, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on 
the totality of the evidence at trial. 
The trial court properly allowed the State to present 
impeachment evidence of defendant's silence prior to any Miranda 
warnings. The issue is not ones of defendant's right to a Miranda 
warning but of the right of the State to use probative evidence 
disputing defendant's claim of innocence at trial. 
The trial court erred in automatically admitting into 
evidence, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2), defendant's 
previous conviction of robbery as a crime of dishonesty. The 
error is harmless, however, because the court subsequently and 
properly admitted evidence of the same crime under Utah R. Evid. 
404(b) to establish defendant's intent. Further, even if the 
evidence had not been admitted, based on the totality of the 
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record, there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN PROPERLY EXERCISING 
ITS DISCRETION IN RULING ON EVIDENTIARY 
MATTERS. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court violated 
defendant's right to confrontation in two ways: 1) in allowing an 
officer to testify to a telephone number contained in a police 
report, and 2) in sustaining objections to certain questions 
posed during cross-examination of the victim (Br. of App. at 12-
15). In raising this argument, defendant concedes that under 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), the state and federal 
constitutional provisions on confrontation should be construed 
similarly, and does not argue for any separate state 
constitutional interpretation (Br. of App. at 11 n.2). As such, 
the State will limit its discussion to federal constitutional 
analysis. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 
1988); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986). 
As noted by defendant, the sixth amendment right to 
confrontation primarily involves the right of cross-examination, 
which encompasses both the admission of out-of-court statements 
and limitations on the scope of cross-examination. Kentucky v. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736-737 (1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 65 
(1988). Functionally, the confrontation clause is interpreted so 
as to promote reliability in evidence considered by the fact-
finder in a criminal trial. Id. at 737. 
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Similarly, the rules of evidence governing hearsay have 
as their core a concern for providing a defendant the right to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him. California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). But, 
[w]hile it may readily be conceded that 
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause 
are generally designed to protect similar 
values, it is quite a different thing to 
suggest that the overlap is complete and 
treat the Confrontation Clause is nothing 
more or less than a codification of the rules 
of hearsay and their exceptions as they 
existed historically at common law. Our 
decisions have never established such a 
congruence; indeed, we have more than once 
found a violation of confrontation values 
even though the statements in issue were 
admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay 
exception. . . . The converse is equally 
true: merely because evidence is admitted in 
violation of a long-established hearsay rule 
does not lead to the automatic conclusion 
that confrontation rights have been denied. 
.Id. at 155-156. Accord State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-205 
(Utah 1987) (citations and footnote omitted). The fallacy of 
defendant's argument is in failing to recognize this distinction 
and by equating, what at best are, improper evidentiary rulings 
with prejudicial constitutional deprivations (Br. of App. at 14-
15). 
A. The Admission of Information from a 
Police Report. 
Defendant argues that the trial court violated 
defendant's right to confrontation by allowing Officer Wade 
Wayment to testify during the State's rebuttal as to a telephone 
number listed in a police report. A brief discussion of the 
evidentiary context of Officer Wayment's testimony is necessary 
before turning to a discussion of its admissibility. 
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Throughout the trial, defendant had presented the 
defense that despite having physically done all the acts 
testified to by the victim, defendant lacked any intent to rob 
the victim and was merely collecting a debt. The defense was 
discussed in evidentiary hearings (MT. 9-12), alluded to in 
defendant's opening statement (T. 9-11), developed during cross-
examination of the victim (T. 41-43), and fully presented by 
defendant during his direct testimony (T2. 22-41). After 
extensive pre-admission evidentiary hearings, the State was 
allowed on rebuttal to present evidence of a prior robbery, 
similar in nature, to which defendant had pled guilty (T2. 68-
2 79). After the details of the previous robbery had been 
testified to by the victim in that case, Paul Christensen, 
Officer Wade Wayment testified. 
The officer stated that, in the case before the court, 
the telephone number given Ambassador Pizza in ordering the pizza 
was not connected to 813 Genessee Street as represented by the 
person placing the order, but was to a pay telephone at Smith's 
Food Store, 828 South 900 West, a block away (T2. 81-82). This 
information was admitted without objection. 
Officer Wayment then testified that he had reviewed the 
police report in the prior Christensen robbery (T2. 82). Officer 
Wayment was asked if he had obtained a telephone number given to 
Free Wheeler Pizza in that case (T2. 82-83). Defendant objected 
for "lack of foundation, hearsay" (T2. 83). The court ordered 
2 
The admissibility of this evidence under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) 
to prove defendant's intent during the encounter will be 
discussed separately under Point IV. 
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the prosecutor to "lay a foundation where he is getting that 
information from" (T2. 83), The officer testified that he got 
the information from the police report, which was prepared and 
kept in the ordinary course of police business. Defendant 
renewed the objection on the same grounds; the objection was 
overruled (T2. 83). Officer Wayment then testified that based on 
the police report, the telephone number of 466-0438 was given 
when the order was placed to Free Wheeler Pizza. The officer 
testified that he searched for the location of such a telephone, 
but the number could not be connected to any location (T2. 83). 
Because the officer knew that the address given in ordering the 
pizza was in the area of 1300 South and 900 East, he transposed 
the telephone number to 466-0348 and connected it to a pay 
telephone at a 7-11 store, a few blocks from the location of the 
Christensen robbery (T2. 84). 
On surrebuttal, defendant testified that he did in fact 
commit the Christensen robbery as testified to by Paul 
Christensen, including having made the telephone call ordering 
the pizza from a pay telephone (T2. 86-89). 
Defendant now argues that in allowing Officer Wayment 
to testify from the police report as to the telephone number used 
by defendant in setting up the Christensen robbery, defendant's 
right to confrontation was violated. In the context of the 
evidence, the argument is specious. 
First and foremost, defendant never denied his 
involvement in the Christensen robbery; nor did he ever contest 
the evidence presented by Paul Christensen as to how the robbery 
-1 £_ 
occurred. Rather, throughout the pretrial hearing, the issue was 
the evidence's admissibility under Utah R. Evid. 404(b), not the 
accuracy or reliability of the facts (MT. 13). This was also 
defendant's position at trial (T. 93-101; T2. 70-73, 86-89). 
Therefore, there was no reliability issue involved, only one of 
relevance and possible prejudice. 
Further, defendant never raised the confrontation issue 
below. Instead, both objections were worded as being for "lack 
of foundation, hearsay" (T2. 83). An objection on grounds of 
hearsay does not necessarily include within it an objection on 
confrontational grounds; for, the constitutional provision does 
not require that hearsay never be introduced. Just the opposite 
is true. Numerous hearsay exceptions exist which do not fall 
within the scope of the confrontation clause. Dutton v. Evans, 
400 U.S. 74, 80-82 (1970) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 407 (1965)). Accord State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d at 204-205. 
As such, this Court should only consider defendant's objection as 
being a general hearsay objection, defendant having waived any 
confrontation argument. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 
(Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). 
Being an evidentiary matter, the ruling is reviewed only for a 
clear abuse of discretion. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 
(Utah 1987); State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Applying the hearsay rules, defendant argues that a 
police report does not qualify for admission under the public 
records exception of Utah R. Evid. 803(8) and cites in support 
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State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983) (Br. of App. at 13). 
However, Bertul does not completely preclude the consideration of 
information in a police report. Instead, the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that the police report itself is not ordinarily 
admissible as a business record, Utah R. Evid. 803(6), or as a 
public document, Utah R. Evid. 803(8), "except when offered to 
prove simple routine matters which are based on first-hand 
knowledge of the maker of the report and do not involve 
conclusions, and when the 'circumstances of their preparation 
indicate their trustworthiness1." I_d. at 1185-86. Here, the 
only information derived from the police report was the telephone 
number given to Free Wheeler Pizza by defendant in placing the 
order which set up the Christensen robbery. The telephone number 
was not recorded by Free Wheeler Pizza in anticipation of 
litigation, but was taken in the normal course of their business 
in receiving the pizza order. Icl. at 1184. Merely because the 
police then included it in a police report does not transform it 
into non-routine information. Since the police report itself was 
not introduced into evidence, the issue is not the admissibility 
of the report, but the admissibility of specific information in 
the report. That information, a telephone number given and 
recorded in the normal course of business, clearly falls within 
3 
the hearsay exceptions of Utah R. Evid. 803. 
3 
It is also arguable, under the unique circumstances of this 
case, that the statement is not hearsay at all, being an 
admission of defendant. Utah R. Crim. P. 801(d)(2). By the time 
the officer testified, defendant had already admitted his guilt 
of the Christensen robbery, Mr. Christensen had testified to the 
details, and none of the facts surrounding the robbery were 
challenged by defendant as inaccurate (T2. 55, 73-75; MT. 13). 
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B. The Scope of Cross-Examination of the 
Victim. 
Defendant also raises a confrontation issue in relation 
to, what defendant characterizes as, the unwarranted limitation 
of cross-examination of the victim, Matthew Moor (Br. of App. at 
14-15). Specifically, defendant argues that his confrontation 
right was violated when the trial court sustained objections to 
defendant's questions of Moor as to his drug and alcohol use 
during the summer months of 1988 (T. 43). However, defendant has 
not adequately preserved the issue for appeal. Rather, defendant 
posed questions of the victim, and when objections were 
sustained, defendant abandoned the line of questioning without 
further argument or factual proffer (T. 42-44). As such, 
defendant has waived his claim on a constitutional ground. Any 
limitations should be reviewed only on general evidentiary 
grounds for abuse of discretion. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 
34-35; Utah R. Evid. 103(a). The appropriateness of the 
questions and adequancy of the objections must be evaluated in 
light of Moor's testimony. 
Matthew Moor, as the first State's witness, had 
completed his direct testimony describing the robbery. Moor had 
stated that the only reason he had given money to defendant was 
because of defendant's threatening demands (T. 21, 24-25, 31). 
Moor testified that he had never met defendant prior to the night 
of the robbery and did not recognize him from anywhere else (T. 
35-36). On cross-examination, Moor denied that defendant ever 
3 
Cont. Further, defendant in surrebuttal admitted placing the 
call (T2. 86-89). 
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represented that he knew Moor or that Moor owed him money (T. 41-
42). Moor denied knowing anyone named Scott Perry, an individual 
defendant later claimed introduced Moor to defendant at a party 
in July 1988 (T. 42-42; T2. 25, 48). The following then ensued: 
Q: (By Ms. Loy) Have you ever been to a 
party on the east side of Salt Lake in the 
area of Trolley Square where you might have 
met Mr. Morrell and don't remember 
specifically? 
A: (By Matthew Moor) Well, there have been 
parties that I have been to where I don't 
remember anything. So, I don't know. I 
don't remember ever having seen Mr. Morrell, 
ever. 
Q: When you say sometimes you don't remember 
anything after being to a party, would that 
be because of alcohol and drug use? 
MR. REED: Objection, Your Honor. I don't 
see where we are going with this. 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
Q. (By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, have you ever 
obtained marijuana from Ken Morrell? 
MR. REED: Objection, Your Honor. He has 
already said he doesn't know Mr. Morrell. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (By Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, is it possible 
that you have met Mr. Morrell at a party and 
you do not know remember him, meeting him at 
a party because of some reason? 
MR. REED: Your honor, this has been asked 
and answered. 
MS. LOY: This is in a different form. 
THE COURT: Overruled. I will let her pursue 
this more. 
. . . 
Q: (BY Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, is it possible 
that you met Mr. Morrell at a party at some 
_on_ 
time in your past and do not remember because 
you have for some reason not remembered what 
occurred at a past party? 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Both of you 
approach the bench. 
(Off the record discussion between Court and 
counsel.) 
Q. (BY Ms. Loy) Mr. Moor, you indicated you 
took some money out of your pocket and handed 
it to Mr. Morrell; is that right? 
(T. 43-44). 
In the context of this case, the trial court did not 
prevent defendant from proper inquiry into any bias or motive of 
the victim appropriate to the jurors' consideration of the 
witness's reliability. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
680 (1986). Defendant's theory of the case was that he knew 
Moor, recognized him the night of the robbery and approached him 
to collect a debt. The circumstances surrounding the debt were 
irrelevant; the issue was defendant's intent in approaching Moor. 
Moor repeatedly denied knowing defendant but admitted that he did 
not always remember everything from the parties he attended (T. 
44). Once Moor denied ever knowing defendant but admitted that 
he could have met him at a party and not remembered, the 
predicate for defendant's theory of the case was laid. Further 
questioning would not have elicited any other information 
supportive of defendant's claim that he knew Moor in light of 
Moor's continued statements that he did not remember ever meeting 
defendant and did not recognize him as someone he knew on the 
night of the robbery. Additionally, Moor had already refuted 
defendant's claim that he told Moor that he was merely collecting 
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a debt. Whether or not Moor was ever under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol at some previous undefined time, was not 
relevant to Moor's recitation of the incident on the night in 
question. The trial judge properly and reasonably restricted 
questioning that was repetitious and only marginally relevant to 
Moor's present credibility or reliability. Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. Accord State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d at 
203 (right of cross-examination is limited by Utah R. Evid. 403; 
phere is no right to "harass, annoy or humiliate the witness"); 
State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980). 
C. Even If Any Error Was Committed, the 
Error Is Harmless. 
The State submits that a harmless-error analysis is 
inapplicable in this case as no error was committed. The 
constitutional issues were not preserved for appeal; instead, 
defendant only objected on evidentiary grounds. As such, the 
court's rulings amounted to nothing more than evidentiary 
rulings, which should be upheld absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Brown, 771 P.2d at 1094. Here, the court properly exercised its 
discretion in ruling on both issues. 
But assuming arguendo that the trial court's rulings 
violated defendant's right to confrontation and that defendant 
has not waived the issue, the standard of review is one of 
harmless-error analysis as delineated under Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. at 681. Accord State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 
1987). That is: 
[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be 
set aside if the reviewing court may 
confidently say, on the whole record, that 
the constitutional error was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. . . . The harmless-error 
doctrine recognizes the principle that the 
central purpose of a criminal trial is to 
decide the factual question of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence, . . . and 
promotes public respect for the criminal 
process by focusing on the underlying 
fairness of the trial rather than on the 
virtually inevitable presence of immaterial 
error. . . . 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall 475 U.S. at 681 (citations omitted). 
Assuming that the trial court improperly admitted into 
evidence the telephone number contained in the police report or 
unduly limited some questions on cross-examination, the effect of 
the rulings could not have reasonably affected the outcome of the 
case. Defendant's involvement in the Christensen robbery and the 
facts concerning that robbery were not in issue. Defendant 
admitted to these matters. Thus, whether the pizza employee who 
had taken the telephone number or the officer testified, is 
wholly irrelevant to the outcome of this case. Similarly, 
whether or not Matthew Moor was ever under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol is irrelevant to defendant's claim that he had 
previously met Moor. Moor testified that he had not met 
defendant but admitted that he did not remember everything from 
parties attended. Follow-up questions concerning whether or not 
Moor bought drugs from defendant were duplicative and 
repetitious; Moor had already testified several times, both on 
direct and cross, that he did not recognize defendant or believe 
that he and defendant had ever met. The scope of cross-
examination did not restrict defendant in developing the theory 
of his case. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE STATE TO 
PRESENT AS IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE DEFENDANT'S 
PRE-MIRANDA FAILURE TO EXCULPATE HIMSELF. 
At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, 
defendant presented Officer Susan Neeley as its first witness. 
On direct examination, Officer Neeley testified that when 
defendant was arrested and searched no evidence was seized from 
defendant's person (T2. 3). Additionally, Officer Neeley 
testified that she interviewed Matthew Moor and Ivan Ilov in 
connection with the case but was not aware of what happened to 
the money in question (T2. 4). On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked: 
At anytime prior to Mr. Morrell's arrest, did 
[he] make any statements to you? 
(T2. 5). Defendant objected on grounds of "improper comment" 
(T2. 5). A hearing continued outside the presence of the jury. 
Defendant restated the objection: 
[M]y objection was stated, I believe, that 
the question asked for an improper comment 
upon my client's silence at the time he was 
in custody, although the answer of the 
officer was that he was not yet arrested, 
Her previous testimony indicated that he was 
restrained by a civilian. They arrived and 
then patted him down. It appears without 
further foundation that it was a comment upon 
his silence upon arrest, and that is why I am 
objecting. 
(T2. 6). The State proffered that defendant's failure to 
exculpate himself was relevant to show his intent at the time of 
the incident in light of his trial claim that he was merely 
collecting a debt from the victim (T2. 6-7). The court requested 
further information as to the sequence of events. 
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Out of the presence of the jury. Officer Neeley 
testified that she was dispatched to approximately 1900 South 
State Street, in response to a call that a fight was occurring 
(T2. 8), While traveling to the location, she received a second 
dispatch that a pizza driver was missing at the same location 
(T2. 8). Arriving, Officer Neeley observed defendant being held 
by Ivan Ilov (T2. 8-9). Immediately, Officer Neeley went to one 
side of defendant while Officer Miller held defendant with his 
arm behind his back (T2. 9). Officer Miller asked defendant 
"What was going on?" (T2. 9), Defendant did not respond. No 
further questions were asked of defendant (T2. 9). Officer 
Neeley testified that even though defendant was not free to 
leave, he was not a suspect or under arrest. Instead, defendant 
was being detained because: 
[W]e [the police] didn't know what was going 
on. When someone is being held like that, we 
have to find out all of the facts. 
(T2. 11). Officer Neeley stated that the detention continued for 
investigative purposes until it could be determined from 
conversation with the victim that a crime had occurred (T2. 11-
12). At that point, defendant was placed under arrest by a third 
officer, Officer Allred (T2. 5, 11). Based on this testimony, 
the court overruled the objection, allowing testimony up to the 
time of arrest (T2. 12). The jury was reconvened. 
With the jury present, Officer Neeley testified that 
she was in defendant's presence for approximately 10-15 minutes 
(T2. 12). During that time, defendant made no statements to her. 
Officer Miller asked defendant what was going on. Defendant did 
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4 
not respond (T2. 13). 
Defendant subsequently testified that he never heard 
the police ask him any question (T2. 51). 
On appeal, defendant claims that the introduction of 
this evidence was constitutionally improper in that "Appellant 
was in custody when Officer Miller asked him what was going on, 
and was entitled to a Miranda warning" (Br. of App. at 18). 
However, the issue is not whether or not defendant was entitled 
to a Miranda warning, but whether defendant's pre-Miranda silence 
could be used to rebut defendant's trial claim that he was not 
involved in any criminal conduct on the night in question. 
Before turning to this issue, the State will respond to the 
Miranda argument posed by defendant. 
There is no question that: 
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, 
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming 
from custodial interrogation of the defendant 
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege 
against self-incrimination. By custodial 
interrogation, we m€*an questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freesdom of action in any 
significant way. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (footnote omitted). 
Custody was further explained by the United States Supreme Court 
in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), where the Court 
stated: 
Although the circumstances of each case 
must certainly influence a determination of 
4 
This represents the entire scope of questioning by the State as 
to defendant's silence. (See T2. 12-13.) 
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whether a suspect is "in custody" for 
purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the 
ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 
"formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement" of the degree associated with a 
formal arrest. . • • 
Id. at 1125 (citations omitted). Utah appears to have adopted a 
similar functional arrest test. State v. Kelly# 718 P.2d 385, 
391 (Utah 1986); Salt Lake City v. Garner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 
(Utah 1983). Without analyzing the issue, it may be assumed 
arguendo that defendant was being detained by the police and was 
not free to leave (T2. 10-12). 
More necessary to this case, is a determination of 
whether the officer's question, "What is going on here?", 
constituted interrogation. As the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized: 
[F]or the purpose of determining whether a 
crime has been committed, investigation and 
interview are critical; under such 
circumstances, the warning is not required. 
Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170. For, 
[i]t would be wholly impractical and the law 
does not require an officer who is 
investigating suspicious circumstances to 
give the "Miranda" warning to everyone of 
whom he asks a question. 
Id. at 1170 (quoting State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 305, 480 P.2d 
736, 737 (1971)). To constitute interrogation for Miranda 
purposes, the police must subject a suspect to "express 
questioning or its functional equivalent . . . not only to 
express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part 
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
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elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island 
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980). Accord United States v. 
Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 379 (10th Cir. 1985) (comment of police in 
searching container that it contained "cocaine, too" did not 
constitute comment which the police "should have known [was] 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response"). 
Here, the testimony established that the police had 
received two dispatches, one that a fight was occurring, another 
that a pizza driver was missing (T2, 8). Arriving on the scene, 
they observed one citizen holding another (T2. 9). As Officer 
Neeley testified, the police did not know at that point what, if 
any, crime had been committed (T2. 11-12). Because the one 
witness had hold of defendant, the police took over, continuing 
the hold but asking the general investigatory question of "What 
is going on here?" (T2. 9-10). When they did not receive a 
response from defendant, they apparently sought other information 
by interviewing Moor (T2. 11). Upon receiving the statement of 
the victim, defendant was arrested (T2. 11). Under the facts of 
this case, the police did nothing more than pose a single 
investigatory question to defendant to determine the facts 
surrounding the dispatch call. Of course, the police were 
suspicious that something criminal had occurred, but at the time 
of the question, they did not know what or by whom (T2. 11-12). 
The question posed was "justified and the answer may well have 
disclosed some perfectly lawful activity." State v. Carlsen, 480 
P.2d at 737. Accord State v. Kelly# 718 P.2d at 391. Therefore, 
no Miranda warning was required. 
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But, as previously stated, the significant issue in 
this case is not the Miranda issue, for no statements of 
defendant were admitted into evidence. Rather, the issue is 
whether the introduction of defendant's silence constituted a 
violation of defendant's constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Though not specifically raised by defendant, the 
State addresses the issue pursuant to its duty to promote 
justice. State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Clearly, the State may not comment on or use in its 
case-in-chief a defendant's silence in response to Miranda 
warnings. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976). But, a 
different rule is applicable where no Miranda warning has been 
given. In the latter case, a defendant's silence is admissible 
to impeach a defense offered for the first time at trial. 
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-607 (1982). The reason for 
the distinction is explicit in the Miranda warning itself. Once 
a defendant is informed that he constitutionally need not respond 
to police questioning, his subsequent silence is "not 
sufficiently probative of an inconsistency with his in-court 
testimony to warrant admission of evidence thereof.11 Jxl. at 605 
(quoting United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975)). On 
the other hand, where no Miranda warning has been given, 
"[c]ommon law traditionally has allowed 
witnesses to be impeached by their previous 
failure to state a fact in circumstances in 
which that fact naturally would have been 
asserted. . . . Each jurisdiction may 
formulate its own rules of evidence to 
determine when prior silence is so 
inconsistent with present statements that 
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impeachment by reference to such silence is 
probative.•' 
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. at 606 (quoting Jenkins v. Anderson, 
447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980)). Thus, 
[i]n the absence of the sort of 
affirmative assurances embodied in the 
Miranda warnings, [the United States Supreme 
Court does] not believe that it violates due 
process of law for a State to permit cross-
examination as to postarrest silence when a 
defendant chooses to take the stand. A State 
is entitled, in such situations, to leave to 
the judge and jury under its own rules of 
evidence the resolution of the extent to 
which postarrest silence may be deemed to 
impeach a criminal defendant's own testimony. 
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 607. Utah courts have implicitly 
recognized this same distinction. Compare State v. Wiswell, 639 
P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981) (prosecutorial misconduct warranted 
reversal where prosecutor elicited testimony of the defendant's 
post-Miranda silence), with State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 375 
(Utah 1982) (no error in admitting into evidence defendant's 
post-arrest silence to refute defendant's claims that he never 
had an opportunity to give an explanation of his activities to 
the police). Accord United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275, 
1279-1280 (10th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1037 (1987) 
(proper to allow evidence of defendant's pre-Miranda silence); 
People v. 0'Sullivan, 217 Cal.App.3d 237, 265 Cal. Rptr. 784, 
787-788 (1990) (no error in allowing into evidence defendant's 
post-arrest but pre-Miranda silence to refute claims of defense). 
Here, the record establishes that even prior to 
defendant actually testifying, it was clear his defense was that 
he was merely collecting a debt from Moor when the altercation 
-•*n_ 
occurred (MT. 12-13; T. 41-43, 93-94, 98). In this context, 
during the defense case and just prior to defendant testifying, 
the State elicited, in cross-examining Officer Neeley, that 
defendant never informed the police that he was collecting a 
debt. The evidence was directly probative of defendant's claim 
of innocence; for if defendant was merely collecting a legitimate 
debt, why would he have refused to give this explanation to the 
police in response to their neutral question of "What is going on 
here?". Under the circumstances, the prosecutor properly 
elicited impeaching evidence of defendant's failure to offer this 
explanation at the time of his arrest. The silence was not 
government induced and was probative in judging the validity of 
the exculpatory defense presented at trial. 
As no constitutional violation was involved, the 
admission of the evidence should be viewed as any other 
evidentiary matter; that is, was it reliable and probative of an 
issue at trial? As such, it is reviewable only for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1035; State v. Brown, 
771 P.2d at 1094. Here, the trial court properly allowed its 
admission. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT'S PREVIOUS CONVICTION 
UNDER UTAH R. OF EVID. 609(a)(2) AS A CRIME 
OF DISHONESTY; BUT, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE, THE ERROR IS HARMLESS. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
admitting into evidence his prior conviction for robbery under 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2) as a crime of dishonesty. Additionally, 
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defendant contends that a plea of guilty is not a conviction for 
purposes of the rule (Br. of App. at 22-27). Because the State 
concedes that the trial court erred in concluding that robbery 
was automatically admissible under Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2) as a 
crime of dishonesty, the State merely notes that defendant's 
argument that a guilty plea alone cannot constitute a conviction 
for purposes of the rule is without merit. State v. Delashmutt, 
676 P.2d 383, 384 (Utah 1983). 
When this matter was raised pretrial, the trial court 
did not have the benefit of State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653-656 
(Utah 1989), in which the Utah Supreme Court concluded that theft 
crimes are not necessarily crimes of dishonesty and therefore not 
automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). Instead, the 
trial court based its ruling on State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1984), concluding: 
Right now, I am following Cintron because I 
think that is the law of the State and I 
think that is the correct law of the State. 
I hope they never change that, but this may 
be the case that you want to try to convince 
them of that. I will hold that robbery is a 
crime of dishonesty. 
MT. at 5). Because of its conclusion that the conviction was 
automatically admissible, the court declined to apply the 
balancing test of Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) as delineated in State 
v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1332-1334 (Utah 1986) (MT. 5). 
Clearly, under the now applicable rulings of the Utah appellate 
courts, the automatic admission of the robbery conviction to 
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impeach defendant's credibility was error. State v. Lanier, 778 
P.2d 9, 10-11 (Utah 1989); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17-18 
(Utah App. 1988). 
However, the State submits that under the facts of this 
case, the error is harmless. As will be discussed in the next 
point, evidence of defendant's robbery conviction was properly 
admitted on other grounds, that is, under Utah R. Evid. 404(b), 
as evidence probative of defendant's intent (T2. 70-73). Thus, 
even if the conviction had not been admitted for impeachment 
under Rule 609(a)(2), there is no reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for defendant. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d at 656 
(citing State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1038, and State v. Banner, 
717 P.2d at 1335). Since the State presented sufficient evidence 
and eyewitness testimony to prove defendant's guilt of the Moor 
robbery, any erroneous admission of the prior conviction for 
impeachment purposes should be viewed as harmless. State v. 
Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah 1989); State v. Bruce, 779 
P.2d at 657. Accord State v. Brown, 771 P.2d at 1095; State v. 
Wight, 765 P.2d at 19-20. Compare State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d at 
11. 
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in allowing 
proof under Rule 609 through the testimony of Paul Christensen 
(Br. of App. at 29). This assertion is incorrect. The robbery 
conviction for purposes of Rule 609 was introduced in the cross-
examination of defendant (T2. 55). Subsequently, for purposes of 
Utah R. of Evid. 404, to establish defendant's intent, Paul 
Christensen testified to the details of the prior robbery. While 
the State concedes error under Rule 609, there was no error under 
Rule 404. This distinction will be thoroughly discussed under 
Point IV of this brief. 
Defendant has not argued on appeal that the evidence was 
insufficent to convict defendant of robbery. 
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POINT IV 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIME WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED AS REBUTTAL EVIDENCE UNDER 
UTAH R. EVID. 404(b) TO PROVE HIS INTENT IN 
COMMITTING THE PRESENT CRIME. 
Defendant argues that aside from the admission of 
defendant's prior robbery conviction for purposes of impeachment, 
the trial court additionally erred in admitting, pursuant to Utah 
R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of the prior crime to establish 
defendant's intent in committing the present crime (Br. of App. 
at 29) . 
A trial court's rulings on evidentiary matters must be 
upheld unless it is "manifest that the trial court so abused its 
discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted," 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1035. Accord, State v. Brown, 771 
P.2d at 1094; State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335. An evidentiary 
ruling as to the admission of evidence, under Utah R. Evid. 403, 
will likewise only be reversed for abuse of discretion where the 
admission of the evidence constituted harmful error. State v. 
Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989); State v. Larson, 775 
P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989). But, erroneous admission of evidence 
will be deemed harmless where there is "convincing, properly 
admitted evidence of all essential elements of the case," State 
v. Bruce, 779 P.2d at 656. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) is a rule of inclusion. Evidence 
of prior acts is admissible if relevant to prove an element of 
the crime, unless under Utah R. Evid. 403, the evidence's 
probative value is "substantially outweighed" by its prejudicial 
effect (T. 148). State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1989); 
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State VJ „. J ami son , 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 85 Utah I,, He\ ihl, HI (I98fj). But, the 
State recognizes, that within the general rule, the Utah 
i l | i[Ji » 11 1 ri I H M l l i J l l S I l i l l 'K Ml l l i l I II 1 / I ' l l h u l l Jill1! (M i l l I SS I I i l l ' 11 I I II I l l l IMM 
potential prejudicial effect State v. Rocco, 130 Utah Adv. Rep. 
Ill, 17 (Utah 1990) (harmless error to adm i t prior and subsequent 
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prior bad acts "reflective of the absence o\ mistake or accident, 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation \ knowledge rr 
MeJ l t:i ty "'" ) ; State v. Gotschai.., ) 
(no error to admit evidence ci other crime to ->how defendant s 
state of mind an defendan ~ * ,., f-defense); 
State v. Florez, - J du i :* . (evidence of 
other crime admissible prove element Time; but, error to 
;--L. . .~ . r - — - 1 42 1 12 7-4 2 8 
(Uta , c ': (harmless error to admit evidence of other crimes .. 
only \Lmally probati * intent); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 
under Utai. 609(2); error , evidence . : fie: 
crimes under Uta> 404(b) t show defendant'? XT^^T * ; 
Sta te v , Jamison 
admissible to show opportunity and knowledge of technique u s e d ) ; 
State v. Shickles, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (evidence of 
ot ht*r crimps adm J h - . | . 
Before turning * . --'its of defendant's clai m, I t 
important to recognize what defendant is i ic t claiming. 
Defendant i s i 10 t asser Li ng t:l lat the evidence of the prior cri me 
was in any way unreliable or contested. Defendant had pled 
guilty to the offense and was awaiting sentencing (MT. 2). 
Defendant, neither pretrial, during trial nor on appeal, has ever 
contested the accuracy of Paul Christensen's recitation of the 
facts surrounding defendant's prior robbery. Nor has defendant 
asserted that the evidence's probative value was outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect. Instead, defendant argues that the 
evidence entirely lacked any probative value (Br. of App. at 32). 
Defendant improperly asserts that "Appellant's intent was not the 
issue in conflict. Rather, it was Appellant's physical actions 
that were contested" (Br. of App. at 29). As such, defendant 
claims that the evidence was not admitted to prove intent, but to 
prove criminal propensity (Br. of App. at 29-30). Defendant's 
argument is factually and legally incorrect. 
Defendant presented testimony that did not dispute the 
physical acts of approaching the victim, Matthew Moor, seeking 
money from Moor, remaining with Moor when he did not receive 
sufficient money, going to Ivan Ilov's to get more money, the 
altercation at Ilov's and the ensuing chase and altercation on 
State Street (T2. 22-36). Instead, defendant contested Moor's 
statements as they related to his intent; that is, was defendant 
merely requesting the repayment of a debt or was he robbing Moor? 
While there was evidence corroborating Moor's description of what 
occurred, the issue to be resolved by the jury came down to a 
7 
pure question of intent, no other elements were in dispute. 
7 
The only fact testified to by the victim which was disputed by 
defendant, other than his intent in demanding money of Moor, was 
the use of a weapon. Moor testified that defendant had a knife 
or fascimile; defendant denied it (T. 19-20; T2. 38). The jury 
negated the testimony that defendant had a weapon by returning a 
w a
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crime, committed within months of this crime, was probative of 
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until after defendant testified. The trial court had a full 
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68-7 3) ."In considering the admission, the court applied the 
proper legal standard. St£tf v S'licl.ie.-
Based 011 the totality " h- evidence *• - ^ * JI,. t concluded t'.d 
the probative value c * :> evidence to prove defendants -: • ••* 
was i ^  substantial! t **. 1 e 
usion IF insistent * : */JS 
Court should defer t; •* trial court - ~uling. State v. 
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1141-1142; State v, Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296; State v. Jamison, 
767 P.2d at 1 3 ?. 
-37-
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's judgment and 
conviction should be affirmed. 
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